

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES

HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM

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In March 2002, through the Homeland Security Presidential Directive Three, the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) was developed. The original intent of the HSAS was to provide a warning mechanism for the federal government; other state and local agency responses were voluntary. However, the intent expanded to include a warning system for local, state, and federal agencies, the private sector and the general public.

Five orange alerts later, the confusion continues with mixed complacency. State and local officials complain about the general nature of the intelligence and the lack specificity directed at a regions or targets. The cost of orange protective measures is adding up into the billions of dollars. Warnings specific to New York City have different values in Utah.

Solutions require a new federal intelligence culture with a new name and location, under the direction of the Department of Homeland Security, distributing specific intelligence, as well as the placement of highly trained intelligence analysts working with multi-agency state or city fusion centers. The media should help in educating the public on the HSAS and promoting volunteer organizations, encouraging participation to assist in Homeland Security and to reduce the fear of a catastrophic event.

Customized HSAS should be developed for each community, state, and private sector business to better utilize protective resources. Protective measures should be implemented with specific intelligence to support the elevation of the HSAS.

KEYWORDS: Homeland Security Directive Presidential Directive Three, Homeland Security Advisory System, HSAS, Department of Homeland Security

“MAINTAIN COURSE AND SPEED...” COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR MARITIME HOMELAND SECURITY AND HOMELAND DEFENSE

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Since 11 September 2001, a number of authorities have provided definitions for both Homeland Security (HS) and Homeland Defense (HD); however, as the definitions develop, they provide less functional detail. The most frequently asked question posed to professionals in the field is “What is the distinction between the Homeland Security mission and the Homeland Defense mission?” What they are really asking is, in a particular scenario, “Who’s in charge of the operation?” “When is it law enforcement, or non-military, and when is it a military operation?” Many have argued that the command structure between the two services needs to be changed to ensure the seam between HS and HD is minimized. This is a natural approach because command and control is possibly the most important of all operational functions. This thesis argues that the Navy and Coast Guard should not establish a joint interagency command structure for the missions of Homeland Security and Homeland Defense. They should continue to coordinate and support one another, when required, but they should not combine the two Services together into a permanent single organization.

KEYWORDS: Homeland Defense, Maritime Domain, Command and Control, Interagency Task Force

**METRICS FOR SUCCESS: USING METRICS IN EXERCISES TO ASSESS THE
PREPAREDNESS OF THE FIRE SERVICE IN HOMELAND SECURITY**

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This thesis examines the current approach taken by the Fire Service to training and exercising, especially in the Fire Department of New York (FDNY), and identifies gaps and problems in those existing systems. The thesis then examines relevant "best practices" from the United States military and the private sector that might be applied to the shortfalls in Fire Service training and exercising. The remainder of the thesis proposes changes to the training and exercise system, designed to make a measurable, sustained impact on the capabilities of the fire service to accomplish Homeland Security and traditional mission requirements.

KEYWORDS: Fire Service, Performance Measurement, FDNY, Operational Exercises, Metrics, HSEEP

**THE GEORGIA INFORMATION SHARING AND ANALYSIS CENTER: A MODEL FOR STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ROLE IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY**

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Since 9/11 there have been many demands for robust intelligence efforts and information sharing in the context of homeland security. This thesis focuses on the critical need for the inclusion of local and state intelligence collection efforts into the broader intelligence community and describes a model for states to follow when creating a statewide Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC). Key organizational and relationship principles are examined. Establishing state ISACs and including them as partners in the fight against terrorism benefits all levels of government at the strategic and tactical intelligence levels. Requirements for successful state level ISACs are identified through numerous cases studies focusing on the Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center.

KEYWORDS: Homeland Security, Information Sharing and Analysis Center, Georgia

**STRATEGIES TO BUILD A TRUSTED AND COLLABORATIVE INFORMATION SHARING
SYSTEM FOR STATE-LEVEL HOMELAND SECURITY**

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At all levels of government, strategies to prevent terrorism rely on the development and distribution of actionable information. It is essential that the United States strengthen its capacity to gather, share, analyze, and disseminate such information. In the State of Utah, however, these efforts have been jeopardized by a failure to adequately understand the cultural impediments to building more effective information systems. Spending more money on "stuff" (hardware, communications systems, etc.) will not provide for better information sharing, unless cultural barriers to change are recognized and taken into account in State planning.

Public safety officers in Utah are, in the author's experience, extremely dedicated and competent public servants. Nevertheless, the top priority in Utah should be building a new culture where trust and collaboration exist among the organizations involved in homeland security. This thesis argues that such collaboration does not exist today, and will not grow naturally on its own. Further, states such as Utah need to develop and implement a strategic plan to build a culture of collaboration. This thesis proposed such a plan, tailored to overcome the specific problems that this research has uncovered.

KEYWORDS: Culture, Group Think, Trust, Parochialism

MULTI-STATE INITIATIVES – AGRICULTURE SECURITY PREPAREDNESS

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To defend American agriculture against foreign or domestic terrorism, it is essential that states build multi-state partnerships to provide for the collaborative plans, programs, and operations needed to protect the nation's food security. The National Homeland Security Strategy puts states on the front lines in the war against terrorism, including the struggle to secure the agriculture industry from potentially devastating attack. The issues surrounding agro-terrorism are vast and complex and the resources of the Federal government to address these issues are limited and overextended. If states attempt to address this threat independently, important opportunities to reduce vulnerability and enhance capability will be lost. To achieve the capabilities needed for agro-terrorism detection, mitigation, preparedness, and response, states must collaborate to build the partnerships and programs their citizens require. This thesis argues that multi-state partnerships are critical to defeating this threat as well as providing a robust response to an attack. Whether intentionally introduced or naturally occurring, infectious diseases can easily cross state borders before an outbreak is detected. States must be prepared to act quickly to mitigate the effects of any crisis. There is a significant opportunity for states to strengthen their abilities to provide for a stronger agriculture counter-terrorism preparedness system. The states can actively further their ability to combat attacks on agriculture by demonstrating leadership in implementing administrative agreements and ultimately adopting compact(s) between states, as well as with the private sector.

PRIVATE SECURITY AS AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

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This thesis argues that first preventers are not limited to law enforcement and/or intelligence personnel. Private security officers are the true first preventers because they control access to the myriad of facilities people enter and exit every day and can recognize abnormal or unusual activity. Based on the observation by President George W. Bush in the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* that 85% of the nation's critical infrastructure is owned by private agencies and organizations, one conclusion is incontrovertible: *No one is in a better position to be a first preventer than the private security officer in America.*

In New York State, a professionally trained and licensed security officer's primary directive is defined as detecting, deterring, and reporting on conditions which might harm life or property. It is incumbent upon government public security officials, *and private security executives themselves*, to cultivate and exploit this undervalued segment of the effort to combat terrorism on a national basis. In order to do so, and to assure the public of the competency of the private security workforce, it is imperative that private security officers be mandated to meet minimum standards.

Therefore, this thesis argues that advocating nationwide, state controlled licensing and training of private security officers is essential to the efforts of the Department of Homeland Security to employ “First Responder” and “First Preventer” strategies in the war on terrorism.

KEYWORDS: New York State, First Preventers, Security Officer, Law Enforcement, Terrorism, Licensing, Training, Private Security Officers, First Responders

PREEMPTION IN U.S. STRATEGIC CULTURE

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This thesis strives to shed light on the genuine significance of the current transformation of the U.S. foreign and strategic policy.

In essence, this thesis concludes that the Bush doctrine of preemption is inconsistent with the American strategic culture and view of the use of force displayed throughout the American foreign policy since the Truman Administration. Although not a revolution *per se* in American goals, the new foreign policy represents a radical change in the manner of pursuing those goals. While promoting a unilateralist foreign policy and revived “war-fighting” strategies, the current Administration takes old rationales a step further. By elevating preemption from the tactical to the strategic level, the doctrine transforms a last resort policy option into a primary offensive strategy with destabilizing consequences for international relations.

The analysis concludes that the increased authority of the hard-line approach in the American foreign and security policy is circumstantial, and the likelihood of its endurance is unrealistic. The international system comprises built-in constraints that raise the cost of isolationist and unilateralist impulses to unbearable levels in the long term. These constraints are the end result of the projection of American national values at an international level.

KEYWORDS: U.S. Foreign and Strategic Policy, War-fighting Strategies, Preemption

EVOLUTION OF TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA: PROSPECTS FOR ITS SOLUTION

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This thesis analyses the causes and evolution of the conflict in the Republic of Moldova and capabilities of three conflict-regulating mechanisms to facilitate the final political solution of this conflict. The leading cause of the conflict is the competition among post-Soviet politicians, fighting over the division of the Soviet state and redistribution of politico-economic benefits. In their fight for power, the elites mobilized instrumental and primordial grievances of the population, thus giving an ethnic aspect to the confrontation. As an important intervening variable for the conflict escalation into a military confrontation is Russian interest in maintaining politico-economic and military domination over the region. Over time, all ethnic causes had been eliminated, thus creating the necessary conditions for the final political settlement of the conflict. However, the status quo, created around this conflict, suits the politico-economic interests of the Transnistrian elites, and reinforced by the Russian interest in keeping the region under its influence, is encouraging them to promote a radical position toward the process of negotiations and to demand anything but independence, a fact that cannot be accepted by the legal Moldovan Government. In such circumstances, the final solution depends on the attitudes of the external players. However, the international players are dispersed over the methods of resolving this conflict, thus reinforcing the deadlock situation in the process of negotiation. This thesis argues that under the current circumstances, none of the conflict

regulating mechanisms, partition, confederation and federation will solve that particular conflict. However, the federalism has the most potential to serve as a tool for unification and conflict-resolution, but only if the international community and internal players will: promote democratic values, rule of law and free market orientation in the region; reduce the benefits of the status quo situation and, finally, offer substantial politico-economic and cultural autonomy combined with fair representation at the central level to the Transdnistrian region.

KEYWORDS: Bessarabia, Moldova, Moldavia, Transdnistria, Dniester, Soviet Union, Russia, USA, Ukraine, Romania, OSCE, EU, NATO, Federalism, Partition, Secession, Confederalism, Primordialism, Instrumentalism, Ethnic Conflict, Conflict-regulation

CARROT, STICK, OR SLEDGEHAMMER: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS FOR NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

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North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons has shaken the foundations of U.S. policy in Northeast Asia. Because of North Korea's record of state-sponsored terrorism, illicit activities, human rights violations, arms sales, and fiery rhetoric, its development of operational nuclear weapons is deeply disturbing. Although most agree that North Korea should not possess nuclear weapons, nobody has a simple solution. This thesis evaluates three U.S. policy options for the North Korean nuclear crisis: incentive-based diplomacy, coercive diplomacy, or military force. These options are analyzed according to four criteria: the impact on North Korea's nuclear weapons, the impact on its neighbors (China, Japan, and South Korea), U.S. policy costs, and the precedent for future proliferation. This thesis shows that diplomacy will fail to achieve U.S. objectives for three reasons. First, neither the United States nor North Korea trust one another following decades of aggression and the demise of the 1994 Agreed Framework. Second, Kim Jong-il will not permit the extensive inspections that the United States demands to increase transparency. Third, multilateral coercive diplomacy is difficult, time-consuming, and not supported by Washington's regional partners. Ultimately, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's question must be answered: "What price is the United States willing to pay to disarm North Korean nuclear weapons?" If Washington is not willing to follow through with the threat of military force, it should not risk coercive diplomacy. Likewise, U.S. leaders may need to decide between maintaining the U.S.-ROK alliance and eliminating North Korean nuclear weapons.

KEYWORDS: Northeast Asia, North Korea, China, Japan, South Korea, United States, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Proliferation, Policy Options, Incentive-based Diplomacy, Coercive Diplomacy, Military Force, Kim Jong-il, Transparency, Brinkmanship, Rationality

EXPANDING THE EUROPEAN UNION'S PETERSBERG TASKS: REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABILITIES

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This thesis analyzes the "updated Petersberg tasks" included in the draft treaty establishing a Constitution for the European Union. The original Petersberg tasks called for forces capable of humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping operations, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. The updated tasks add conflict prevention, joint disarmament, military advice and assistance,

post-conflict stabilization, and support to third world countries in combating terrorism. The thesis focuses on the requirements of these tasks and the capabilities of the European Union's civilian agencies and military forces to execute them. It explores the meaning of the new missions, their specific capability requirements, and the prospects for the European Union to meet these requirements. It concludes that the European Union is currently capable of undertaking the missions that require mostly civilian tools or medium-level military forces for their conduct. The European Union does not at present have the relevant capabilities for the missions that demand more advanced military forces.

KEYWORDS: European Union, EU, European Security and Defense Policy, ESDP, European Constitution, Conflict Prevention, Joint Disarmament, Military Advice and Assistance, Post-conflict Stabilization, Support in Combating Terrorism, International Cooperation, Global Peace and Security

FIRST RESPONDER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION TRAINING USING MASSIVELY MULTIPLAYER ON-LINE GAMING

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In this thesis, massively multiplayer on-line gaming (MMOG) is proposed as a new methodology to provide weapons of mass destruction (WMD) response training to first responders. MMOGs training tools offer the benefits of cost savings, standardization, and increased effectiveness over traditional "in residence" training delivery methods. MMOGs can scale to meet the needs of the 4.2 million first responders in a cost efficient manner. Use of modern information technologies and MMOGs will improve overall efficiency of training delivery, while meeting the expectations and requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act as well as national strategies, to prepare an effective response to WMD terrorism.

KEYWORDS: Massively Multiplayer On-line Gaming, First Responder, Game Based Training, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Hazardous Materials, Information Technology, Motion Capture, Personal Protective Equipment, Incident Command System

SWISS ARMED FORCES XXI – THE ANSWER TO CURRENT OR FUTURE THREATS?

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A changed security environment after the end of the Cold War forced Switzerland, Austria, and Sweden to reassess their security policy. New threats and challenges, such as international terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), organized crime, the greater disparity of wealth, and increased migration, have replaced traditional military threats. Larger non-military concerns like peacekeeping operations, humanitarian support, and support to civil authorities have replaced territorial defense, all of which require international cooperation.

Following a comprehensive security strategy, Switzerland, Austria, and Sweden aim to defend their territory, protect their population, and foster international peace and security. Austria and Sweden focus on integration and solidarity with the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Switzerland retains its perpetual neutrality, but has shown increased international cooperation. Austria and Sweden model their Armed Forces after the *EU Petersberg Tasks* and have small peacetime organizations with a professional cadre and annual conscripts. The Swiss Armed Forces XXI focus on territorial defense and are organized in accordance with universal conscription and wartime organization policies.

Traditional political, social, and economic aspects hinder Switzerland from following a straightforward strategy toward solidarity and fundamental change in its Armed Forces. Switzerland's new security policy and its Armed Forces XXI do not fully meet the requirements to fight new threats and challenges together with the international community.

KEYWORDS: Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, Security Policy, Security Strategy, Armed Forces, Militia Armed Forces, Neutrality, Solidarity, Military Transformation, Swiss Armed Forces XXI

FUNDING FIRST RESPONDERS FROM A THREAT AND PREVENTION APPROACH

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It has been thirty-three months since the United States was attacked by terrorists on September 11, 2001. Yet, in distributing grants to states and localities to build their capacity for homeland security, the Nation continues to rely on funding formulae that are deeply flawed. Many grants are distributed in ways that ignore need-driven criteria, such as where terrorists are most likely to strike and which targets are most critical. This thesis develops an alternative formula that takes need into account (and therefore is much more likely to send funds where they are required). After reviewing need-driven formulae from a range of fields that might be applied to homeland security, the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) is used to break the objectives of homeland security capacity-building into discreet, measurable components. Then, the criteria that should be used to build a grant allocation process to accomplish those objectives are analyzed, including population density, criticality of infrastructure, the threat to a municipality, vulnerability to that threat, and terrorism prevention. The resulting formula is far better structured than the current system to put homeland security grant funds where they are most needed.

KEYWORDS: Homeland Security Grants, Analytic Hierarchy Process, Formula Grants, Threat Based Formula, Prevention Based Formula, Critical Infrastructure, Vulnerability, Population Density

LEVERAGING NATIONAL GUARD COUNTERDRUG ASSETS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY

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This thesis describes how existing capabilities in the National Guard Counterdrug (NG CD) Support Program can be leveraged for use in Homeland Security (HLS) missions, and explains the implications for organizing a NG HLS Support Program. National Guard CD assets should be made dual-use for HLS activities and additional missions should be added to the CD mission, leveraging existing resources for HLS prevention. The state governors will have the flexibility of having highly trained and equipped soldiers for HLS activities according to the needs of the state and the current threat level. An already established integrated program in West Virginia provided a suitable model for conducting a case study to determine additional missions to supplement the NG CD Support Program in other states. Examples of additional CD-HLS missions include CD intelligence analysts tracking suspicious activities and CD ground reconnaissance teams cross-trained to assist with the FSIVA mission for the protection of critical infrastructure. Potential challenges of integration include funding and personnel shortages, along with legal restrictions. Solutions include developing stabilized and fenced funding with cross-leveling up to a designated threshold, adding more dual-use personnel and HLS core staffing, and amending the CD statute.

KEYWORDS: National Guard, Homeland Security, Counterdrug, West Virginia, Prevention

SECURITY STUDIES

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACHES AT THE STATE GOVERNMENT LEVEL

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State governments have been recognized as the fusion point for a significant portion of policy, operational, and implementation activities for homeland security. Additionally, the most critical decisions for allocating resources and prioritizing efforts have been delegated to states. The federal government has required this role of states and has asked them to organize task forces to deal with these challenges, but has provided little guidance about how states might establish, administer, and ensure effectiveness of these structures. States have begun to establish decision making bodies independently, inconsistently, and with few measurements to evaluate effectiveness.

This thesis provides a roadmap to success for individual state organizational approaches for homeland security. The recommendations are based upon an analysis of directives, expectations, national strategies, existing approaches, and a case study of one state's efforts. The call for organizing for the war on terror is acknowledged, accepted, and for the most part, vigorously answered. But *how* the nation's states organize and to *what* ends their resources are applied will determine national and even international victory in the war on terrorism. This project provides a model charter, recommended outcomes and outputs for a state structure, and several policy considerations for the State of Washington's Homeland Security infrastructure.

KEYWORDS: Homeland Security Task Force, HSTF, Organizational Structure, Model Charter, Outcomes, Outputs, Terrorism, Homeland Security